Introduction
Multi-actor global funds (MGFs), as identified in this study, are emerging as an increasingly popular and important mechanism for the mobilization and distribution of international financial resources. Several such funds already have annual disbursements that exceed the core budgets of major UN agencies, and new funds with even broader mandates are currently being proposed. At first glance, these powerful instruments for globally co-ordinated action represent a departure from traditional forms of multilateral governance because non-state actors share decision-making powers and financing responsibilities with national governments, as in other forms of 'networked', multi-actor governance that are developing at the global level. Yet comparatively little is known about the way these funds operate, whether they are desirable as instruments for financing major international initiatives, and what implications they might have more broadly for global governance. This last question seems especially important, considering that, even though a key principle behind these funds is that they are 'additional' to existing sources of finance, the proliferation of MGFs may come at the expense of established international organizations -both in terms of resource flows and of their prestige in the international system.
The funds described here are different from the official trust funds that have been administered by the World Bank and other international organizations for decades. MGFs are dedicated to a specific issue or policy area of global significance, and they explicitly involve multiple stakeholders. They operate as partnerships between the 'official' sector (governments and intergovernmental organizations at various levels) and business (including private charitable foundations and individual corporations), NGOs of different types and geographies, and other actors, such as education and research institutions. MGFs operate independently of any single institution, and are usually set up either as new entities with their own legal identity or as alliances with legally constituted financing arms. The principal case study in this chapter is the new Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). The fund, which has so far collected more than US$2 billion in pledges from governments and the private sector, is a major international enterprise that is likely to set an important precedent for future efforts like it in other areas of global concern. 1 The research presented here is based on a detailed study of the negotiation process to establish the fund, and its subsequent start-up phase, a period that raised many of the difficult technical and political choices involved in establishing MGFs. A second MGF with fairly similar characteristics is the recently established Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and its financial instrument, the Vaccine Fund, 2 whose mission is children's immunization. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), which derives its mandate from multilateral environmental agreements formed in the early 1990s, is a treaty instrument that limits the involvement of non-state actors in its governance arrangements, and in that sense is distinct from GFATM and GAVI. But it has faced a number of similar challenges, and so is included here for comparison. Some basic facts about these funds are outlined in Table 6 .1.
This chapter evaluates critically the potential of multi-actor global funds as financing instruments, and, as some see them, pilot programmes for new and improved global governance. 3 MGFs aspire to be innovative and more effective than traditional instruments in a number of areas. First, they are designed to be 'lean', 'non-bureaucratic' and 'quick to act' -qualities that are often seen as being lacking in institutions and financing channels with broader mandates. Second, they promise an aggressive focus on results, to
